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In 1998, Shawn Fanning took a complaint from his roommate that there was
no easy way to find free music on the Internet, and made this wish a reality by
creating Napster Inc. ("Napster").2 Any individual with computer access could
go on to Napster's website and download its free file-sharing software.' With
Napster software, users could perform a search for various artists and music,
and then download the songs they wanted from that search list onto their com-
puter.4 The concept was simple - individual computer users could store vari-
ous songs on their computers and then upload them onto Napster's central
servers.' From the central servers, the files would then be shared with other
I Cynthia L. Webb, Software Doesn't Break Laws . . . , WASHINGTONPOST.COM, at
www.washingtonpost.com, (Aug. 20, 2004). Peer-to-Peer (P2P) software distributors have
successfully argued in some of the following cases to be discussed, that similar to the Na-
tional Rifle Association's argument that guns do not kill people, people kill people, and that
P2P software distributors do not infringe copyrights, only users of that software infringe. Id.
This Note challenges that argument and others.
2 The Brain Behind Napster, CBSNEws.coM, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stori-
es/2000/10/10/6011/main239876.shtml (Oct. 10, 2000).
3 Id. For further discussion on how the recording industry has brought thousands of
lawsuits against individual users in an effort to combat P2P piracy, see Brandon Michael
Francavillo, Comment, Pretzel Logic: The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Contributory Copy-
right Infringement Mandates that the Supreme Court Revisit Sony, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 855
(2004).
4 The Brain Behind Napster, CBSNEws.coM, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stori-
es/2000/10/10/6011/main239876.shtml (Oct. 10, 2000).
5 See id; see also A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D.
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Napster users.6 The consequences of this system, however, were not so simple.
Significant players in the music recording industry brought suit against Nap-
ster claiming copyright infringements on the reproduction and distribution
rights of the copyrighted works that were uploaded and subsequently
downloaded from the Napster site. Although the software itself was free to
download, its effect was costly to the artists and innovators who created the
songs.8 The artists and innovators never gave Napster users permission to copy
or distribute their works, nor were they paid royalty payments they would oth-
erwise be paid.9 The courts eventually held in favor of the recording industry."
As a result, Napster was shut down in its original form."
In 2000, two software distributors, Grokster Ltd. ("Grokster") and Stream-
Cast Networks Inc., provided the public with new software that enabled users
to exchange digital media via a peer-to-peer network (P2P). 2 Unlike the tech-
nology in Napster, Grokster and StreamCast's software did not rely on a cen-
tral server. 3 Grokster and StreamCast users could now share directly with
each other, rather than through some central location. 4 The sound recording
and music publishing industries, in conjunction with the motion picture indus-
Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Napster I].
6 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
7 See generally Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896; A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Napster 11].
8 See Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearing Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman
and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America) [hereinafter Hearings] (discussing
loss of unit sales due to P2P copyright infringement); see also Jefferson Graham, Students
Score Music Perks as Colleges Fight Piracy, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, at IA. The Re-
cording Industry Association of America (RIAA) states that $4.2 billion is lost each year
due to file-swapping. Id.
9 See Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902, 903; Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1011, 1013 (dis-
cussing lack of permission by authors); 17 U.S.C, §§801, 1004 (2000) (recalling royalty
payments).
10 See generally Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004.
11 Id.
12 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp.2d
1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) [hereinafter Grokster I]; see also Grokster's website, at
http://www.grokster.com/aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Grokster refers to itself
as
[Ain advanced peer to peer file sharing program that enables users to share any digital
file including images, audio, video, reports, documents, etc. Content developers and
owners may ... easily broadcast their files through the Grokster software . . . [and us-
ers can their own] works ... Grokster, LTD. is an international software company ...
providing ... person-to-person software ... [It] is privately held and headquartered in
Nevis, West Indies.
Id.
3 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1031, 1039-40.
"4 Id.
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try, filed suit against both companies for copyright infringement. 5 Though the
same court was responsible for shutting down Napster years earlier, the Ninth
Circuit held in favor of the software distributors in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. (MGM) v. Grokster Ltd. ("Grokster I ''.6 and "Grokster I/"'7).'8 In
making its decision, the Ninth Circuit ignored credible allegations that showed
that over ninety percent of the material being shared on these sites was copy-
righted.'9
The Grokster decisions (I and 11) ostensibly relied on existing copyright law,
and courts have struggled with the application of the current law to varying
P2P software. Copyright infringement is running rampant via P2P technology,
and the financial health and survival of the entertainment industry is suffering
as a result.2" Technology that has legitimate, non-infringing uses must con-
tinue to be protected for public use, but copyright law must be modernized in
light of recent P2P technologies that have led to the substantial infringement.
Courts alone cannot adequately solve the problem. For this reason, a new leg-
islative standard should be enacted to remedy the problem.
The new standard should create an atmosphere that is beneficial to the in-
dustry, the artists, authors, and consumers. The standard should be technology
neutral, look to actual infringing use,2 determine whether the creator of the
product or service turns a blind eye to the infringement,22 analyze the effect the
infringement has on the market,23 and establish whether the product or service
was created with the intent to induce, encourage, or materially contribute to the
infringing activity. 4
Part I of this Note will explain the varying P2P file-sharing technologies.
Part II will discuss the primary and secondary liability laws pertaining to P2P
15 See generally Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d 1029.
16 Id.
17 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154,
1157 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Grokster I1].
18 Id.
19 Id. at 115 8.
20 See Hearings, supra note 8 (discussing the loss of unit sales as a result of P2P tech-
nology); Graham, supra note 8.
21 See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 910 (2004); see also In re
Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Aimster II]
(referring to probable versus actual); Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Senator Hatch,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary) (referring to technology neutral).
22 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650.
23 Francavillo, supra note 3, at 884 ("Perhaps it would be better for copyright law to
consider the effect that an alleged infringer's 'actions [have] had on the copyright holder's
opportunities for commercial exploitation.' This standard would hold P2P services, rather
than individuals, generally liable for infringement.").
24 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch) (referring to Inducing
Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. §g (2004)).
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technology and copyright infringement, including the landmark copyright in-
fringement case, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios ("Sony"),25
known as the "Magna Carta of innovation."26 In Part III, this Note will exam-
ine the judicial attempts to effectively apply Sony to P2P technologies in A &
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. ("Napster /,127 and "Napster ITI"28), and In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., ("Aimster , 29 and "Aimster 1/"30). Part IV will show
that the current law is ineffective in protecting copyrights as evidenced by the
rampant copyright infringement occurring through P2P software. Part V will
examine a new copyright infringement standard for secondary liability. Fi-
nally, this Note will conclude that the entertainment and P2P technology indus-
tries can still have a symbiotic relationship when the right law is in place.
II. PEER-TO-PEER TECHNOLOGY
Special Legal Advisor to the U.S. Copyright Office, Jesse Feder, defined
P2P technology as, "interactions between machines of equal status on the net-
work. '31  Most computer users experience similar "interactions" when they
access the web through an Internet service provider (ISP), such as AOL.32 This
interaction is typically considered a client-server relationship: a website is
hosted on a server, and the client, or "user", accesses that website by connect-
ing to that server. 33 Once peer-to-peer software is downloaded to a user's
computer, it adds an index component to the client-server relationship.34 The
index mechanism "maintains a list of the resources available on the peer-to-
peer network at any given time and the... addresses of computer where those
resources may be found."35 An index function can be either centralized or de-
25 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
26 Amol Sharma, Technology Groups Propose Language to Narrow File-Sharing Bill,
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, at http://ww.cq.com/display.do?dockey=lcqonline/prod (Aug.
24, 2004).
27 See generally Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
28 See generally Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
29 See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig. 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. 111. 2002)
[hereinafter Aimster I].
30 See generally Aimster II, 334 F. 3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
31 Feder, supra note 21, at 862. Feder argues that this definition is too broad. He states
that a more specific, useful definition is "a class of applications that takes advantage of re-
sources - storage, cycles, content, human presence - available at the edges of the Internet."
Id.
32 AOL, or America Online, is an Internet Service Provider that supplies its users with
software that allows them to connect to the Internet. See AOL website, at
http://www.corp.aol.com/whoweare/history.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
33 Feder, supra note 21, at 863.
34 Id. at 864 (discussing adding an index component); Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1160(referring to downloading software to a users' computer).
35 Feder, supra note 21, at 864.
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centralized. 6 In the former, a single central server is used to sustain a catalog
of resources, and in the latter, all computers in the P2P network act as indexing
servers. 7 The centralized-decentralized distinction is critical because it distin-
guishes the Grokster and Napster decisions. 8 With the addition of the index
component, the client-server relationship in P2P technology becomes murky.
9
With this technology, a client can now act as a server, and a server as a client."
In other words, information stored on one client's computer can now be trans-
ferred to another client's computer, meaning it is now acting as a server, rather
than as a client.4'
The interaction between computers is varying and intricate, particularly with
P2P technologies. This Note will discuss how the slightest variation in a prod-
uct has been the determining factor in whether or not it withstands judicial
scrutiny. Having discussed the basic workings of P2P technologies, Part II
will now look to basic copyright law and how the law is applied to P2P tech-
nology.
1II. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LIABILITY
A. The U.S. Constitution and the Copyright Act
Copyright law is a creature of federal statute and preempts state law.
4 2 Con-
gress' authority to create copyright legislation stems from Article I, Section 9,
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that Congress has the power
"[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."43 Congress has tried to carry out the Constitution's intent by
passing various pieces of copyright legislation, including the Copyright Acts of
1908 and 1976.'
The Copyright Act protects copyrights in the form of "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
veloped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device . . . including
36 Id.
37 Id. at 864-65.
38 See Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1163 (discussing the differing technologies in Grokster
and Napster).
39 Feder, supra note 21, at 863-64.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 863.
42 17 U.S.C. §912 (2000).
43 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 8.
44 The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§101 - 1332 (2000).
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musical works ... [and] sound recordings." 5 Such protection begins at crea-
tion and lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years. 6 This copyright
safeguard gives the author, among other rights, exclusive authority "to repro-
duce the copyrighted work[s,] ...prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work[s,] .. .distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public[,] . . .perform the copyrighted work publicly[, and] display
the copyrighted work publicly . . . "' A copyright infringement, on the other
hand, is a violation of "any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owners as
provided by sections 106 through 121."48 The author's copyright is infringed
upon when his copyright is exercised without his or her permission, or when it
does not fall under one of the listed exceptions, such as fair use. 9
Changes to copyright law have been intentionally avoided by the courts, and
the courts' reliance on Congress to make amendments in this area of the law
has been strong. As the Sony Court indicated, copyright law changes are of-
ten in response to an advancement in technology.' The fine line that courts
and Congress try to balance is motivating creativity without blocking public
access to that creativity, the original intent of Article 1, §8.2
B. Theories of Liability in Copyright Law
Liability under the Copyright Act arises in two ways: direct infringement
and secondary liability. 3 Direct infringement occurs when an individual
makes use of rights without authorization from the author or under the permis-
45 17 U.S.C. §102 (a)(2) (2000).
46 Id. §302(a) (2000).
47 Id. §106 (1)-(5) (2000).
48 Id. §501(a) (2000).
49 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§107 - 122 (providing the subject matter and scope of
copyright, including exceptions to the author's exclusive rights).
50 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429-30 (1984).
51 Id. at 430.
52 Id. at 429; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technol-
ogy, Private Copying, and the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813, 817-18(2001) (providing a discussion about balancing interests of protecting authors, while provid-
ing the public access to authors' works); See Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 429:
[T]he limited [Constitutional] grant is a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inven-
tors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d. Sess., 7 (1909)). With regard to Congress'
role, see id. at 429 ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to
authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work prod-
uct.").
51 Feder, supra note 21, at 868.
[Vol. 13
Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do?
sion of the listed exceptions. 4 An example of direct infringement would be
copying and distributing a copyrighted piece of sheet music without the com-
poser's permission." Secondary liability occurs when an individual has had
"some degree of involvement in a direct infringement." 56 Secondary liability
currently involves two court-developed theories of law: vicarious liability and
contributory infringement." Vicarious liability occurs when the infringer (I)
has the "right and ability" to control the infringing conduct and (2) receives a
benefit from the infringement.58 Contributory infringement, on the other hand,
asks whether the alleged infringer has knowledge and participation of the di-
rect infringers' activities. 9 An example of secondary liability would be where
third-party vendors of a flea market are selling counterfeit sound recordings
without the owners' permission, and the operators of the flea market are held
liable for the direct infringement of those vendors.6"
C. Sony: The Case that Shaped Secondary Liability for all Future Technology
The Supreme Court decided Sony in 1984.6" The decision dealt with the
then-new technology of Betamax VTRs, or Video Tape Recorders, manufac-
tured and sold by Sony.62 Plaintiffs Universal City Studios Inc. and Walt Dis-
ney Productions brought suit against Sony because the VTRs sold by the com-
54 Id.
55 See 17 U.S.C. §§102, 106, 114, 501, 114 (2000). The composer, as the copyright
owner, has the exclusive right to copy and distribute its work. Without the author's permis-
sion, an individual who copies and distributes the author's work, is infringing on that copy-
right. Id.
56 Feder, supra note 21, at 868.
57 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-63 (2d
Cir. 1971).58 Id. at 1162.
59 Id.; see also Napster 11, 239 F.3d at 1004, 1019. Although the Napster H court recites
the Gershwin Publ'g Corp. test word-for-word, it leaves out the element of induce when
applying the standard to the facts at hand. Id.
60 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). The flea
market operators were found vicariously liable for the direct infringement of their vendors:
they controlled the infringing activity because they "direct[ed] infringers through its rules
and regulations; (2) policed its booth to make sure the regulations were followed; and (3)
promoted the show in which direct infringers participated..." Id. at 263. The operators
received a financial benefit because they received "admission fees, concession stand sales
and parking fees, all of which flow directly from customers who want to buy the counterfeit
recordings at bargain basement prices." Id. The flea market operators were also found con-
tributory liable for the direct infringement of the vendors because: first, "[t]here is no ques-
tion that the plaintiff adequately alleged the element of knowledge in this case[,]" and sec-
ond, the operators materially contributed when they provided the "space, utilities, parking,
advertising, plumbing, and customers." Id. at 264.
61 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
62 Id. at 419-420.
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pany were being used by consumers to record copyright protected broadcasts. 63
The question in the case was whether sale of the copying equipment, the VTR,
to consumers violated aspects of the Copyright Act.'
The Supreme Court in Sony did not parse out the elements of contributory or
vicarious infringement and apply them to the case at hand. 65 Rather it looked
to the Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.66 case to determine whether contributory li-
ability was present.67 The Court in Kalem found contributory liability where
there was "an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer and the con-
tributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred. ' 68 Applying this
standard to the facts before it, the Sony Court found no contributory infringe-
ment since there was no ongoing relationship between the alleged contributor
and direct infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred.69 Second, the
Court found that no Sony employee had contact with the ongoing infringing
activities of the VTR purchasers."0
63 Id. at 421-22.
64 Id. at 420.
65 Feder, supra note 21, at 875.
The Opinion of the Court did not focus on the individual elements of contributory in-
fringement, instead framing the issue thus: If vicarious liability is to be imposed on
Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with constructive
knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized
copies of copyrighted material. There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the
imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.
Id.; see also discussion in Sony about "the lines between direct infringement, contributory
infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn." Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at
435 n. 17 (quoting Universal Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 457-58(D.C. Cal. 1979)). Regardless, the Court states that the question of liability under the direct
infringement and vicarious liability were not before the Court. Id. Note that the Court uses
the terms "contributory infringement" and "vicarious liability" interchangeably throughout
the decision. Sony states that vicarious liability can be found if the contributory infringer
was, "in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized the
use without permission from the copyright owner," but vicarious liability is not imposed in
this case. Id. at 437. It stated that although there was no prior copyright law to support the
theory, vicarious liability would only be imposed on Sony if it "[had] sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make unau-
thorized copies of copyrighted material." Id. at 439.
66 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
67 Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 435-37. Justice O'Connor, the swing vote in the hold-
ing, urged the Court to recognize the relevancy of the Gershwin decision, which stated the
two secondary theories of liability (i.e., contributory infringement and vicarious liability),
and the two elements of each respective theory. Lee Hollar, Sony Revisited.- A New Look at
Contributory Copyright Infringement, at http://digital-law-online.info/papers/lah/sony-
revisted.htm (Aug. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Sony Revisited] (quoting letter of June 21, 1983,
from Justice O'Connor to Justice Blackmun.). Regardless, the Court framed the issue based
on Kalem. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 435-37.
68 Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 437 (citing Kalem, 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
69 Id. at 437-38.
70 Id. at 438.
[Vol. 13
Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do?
Despite the Supreme Court finding Sony not contributory liable, it held that
the public's interest is implicated when a "staple article of commerce" is being
used for copyright infringement.7 If a "staple article of commerce" is found to
be contributorily liable, it does not automatically get removed from the stream
of commerce. 2 The Court was concerned about continuing the public's access
to such a "staple article of commerce," despite the product's infringing activi-
ties.73 In borrowing language from patent law, the Supreme Court created a
complete defense to contributory infringement in copyright infringement cases:
"a 'staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial nonin-
fringing use' is not contributory infringement."74 If an article of commerce is
"widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes[, or] merely ... capable
of substantial noninfringing uses," it is not contributory infringement.75 The
Court went on to find that:
[T]he question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant nonin-
fringing uses. In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the different poten-
tial uses of the machine and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement.
Rather we need only consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the District
Court a significant number of them would be noninfringing ... we need not give precise
content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. 7
Applying this standard to the VTR, the Court found commercially signifi-
cant noninfringing uses based on the VTR's primary use, time-shifting, or re-
cording of live broadcasts to be watched at a later time.77
In sum, the Sony Court did not find contributory infringement because there
was no ongoing relationship between the alleged infringer and the direct in-
fringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred. Regardless of its finding, it
borrowed language from patent law, and created a complete defense to con-
71 Id. at 440.
72 Id. at 440-441.
73 Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 440.
74 Id. at 440-42.
[T]he [Patent] Act expressly provides that the sale of a "staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is not contributory infringement.
• .Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of com-
merce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.
Id.
75 Id. at 443.
76 Id.
77 Id. Time shifting occurs when an individual records a program with his VTR that he
knows he cannot view during the time of the live broadcast. Id. at 422. Once recorded, the
VTR user simply views the VTR taping at a later time. Id. Studies performed by both par-
ties in the case showed that the VTR's primary use was time shifting. Id. at 423. The Court
agreed that the VTR's primary use was time-shifting, which was deemed fair use, meaning
non-infringing, due to its "noncommercial nature." Id. at 442-51.
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tributory infringement, the "staple article of commerce" doctrine."8 The doc-
trine is such that if an article is deemed capable of substantial non-infringing
use, its manufacturer or distributor is not found secondarily liable for the in-
fringement activities of its user.79 Here, the VTR was found capable of com-
mercially significant non-infringing uses because of its primary use, time-
shifting." Thus, Sony's sale of the VTR to the general public did not violate
aspects of the Copyright Act.8
The Sony case is most potent not for its flimsy analysis of contributory li-
ability, nor its lack of applying vicarious liability, but rather its creation of the
"Sony defense" to contributory infringement. The Sony defense has been rou-
tinely applied to various technologies, including the recent P2P technology
cases discussed in the Note. However, its application in the P2P cases has
been inconsistent and difficult to apply.
IV. RECENT P2P CASES: JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO APPLY SONY
EFFECTIVELY
Some 20 years after the Sony decision, P2P technology emerged as one of
the fastest and most convenient ways to share files both copyrighted and non-
copyrighted.82 The technology allows its users to copy and distribute digital
files, including copyrighted works.83 P2P users who copy and distribute copy-
righted works are, by definition, directly infringing." These users are in viola-
tion of Section 106 of the Copyright Act, which gives the author or copyright
owner the exclusive right to reproduce or distribute the copyrighted work(s),
among others.85 It would be difficult to hold the creators or distributors of the
infringing software directly liable for copyright infringement because they are
not performing the actual infringing acts. Rather, P2P software distributors
can be found secondarily liable through the direct copyright infringement by
their users. The following decisions discuss the two secondary liability theo-
ries, contributory infringement and vicarious liability, and the available Sony
defense.
78 Id. at 440-42.
79 Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 440-42.
80 Id. at 440-56.
81 Id. at 456.
82 See Feder, supra note 21, at 860-68.
83 Id.
84 See Napster I, 114 F. Supp.3d at 911 (discussing proof of direct infringement); Grok-
ster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1034-35 (discussing proof of direct infringement.); see generally
Francavillo, supra note 3 (providing a discussion why it was more efficient to sue distribu-
tors and manufacturers, rather that individual infringers).
85 17 U.S.C. §106 (2000).
[Vol. 13
Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do?
A. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
The plaintiffs in Napster I and H included a strong contingency of the music
recording industry, who brought suit against Napster Inc. on the basis of con-
tributory infringement and vicarious liability.86 Napster's free software al-
lowed users to store their music files in a way that would allow them to share
the files with other Napster users. 87 The software had a search component
which allowed Napster users to find music files kept on other Napster users'
computers.88 The software permitted Napster users to swap exact replicas of
the music files between one Napster user and another.89 Napster's technology
used a modified version of centralized indexing, meaning that instead of using
one single central server to maintain the indexed information, several servers
are chosen to act as indexing servers.9"
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit performed a more element-specific analysis
than the Sony Court. The Napster II court relied on Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. to define contributory infringer as "one who,
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially con-
tributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contribu-
tory' infringer."'" With regard to the first element of knowledge, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court by finding that Napster had actual and con-
structive knowledge of its users' infringement activities.92 The court found this
"actual and constructive" knowledge in two ways. First, an internal company
document written by one of Napster's co-founders, stated that company offi-
cials knew Napster users were exchanging copyrighted music.93 Second, Nap-
ster had knowledge when the RIAA informed the company of over 12,000 di-
86 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1010-11, 1013. The court noted that secondary liability
for copyright infringement cannot exist without direct infringement of a third-party. Id. at
1013 n. 2. The District Court found direct infringement by Napster's users, an issue not
appealed by Napster. Id. at 1013. Nevertheless, in order to address the threshold require-
ment, the court analyzed whether there was direct infringement by Napster's users. Id. To
prove direct infringement, plaintiffs must show (1) ownership of the allegedly infringed
material, and (2) alleged infringers violated at least one exclusive right granted to copyright
holders under 17 U.S.C. §106. Id. The court found that the plaintiff sufficiently demon-
strated both prongs. Id. at 10 13-14.
87 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1011.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Feder, supra note 21, at 864-65.
91 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) and Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259 (9thCir. 1996)).
92 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020.
93 Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918. The internal memo stated the "need to remain





Napster counter-argued that even if it had knowledge, the company should
not be held contributory liable based on the Sony defense.95 Napster pointed to
the contributory liability defense: if a product is capable of substantial nonin-
fringing uses, its creators or distributors cannot be found contributory liable.96
Regardless of the balance between Napster's infringing and non-infringing
uses, the Ninth Circuit found enough knowledge on behalf of Napster to show
contributory liability, and thus held that the Sony defense would not apply.97
The court went on to find that Napster's conduct met the second element of
contributory infringement, material contribution.99 By allowing its users to
locate and download music files, the court found Napster's software provided
its users with the "site and facilities" for their direct infringement constituting
material contribution.99 Thus, the court held that Napster's conduct met the
two elements of contributory infringement, knowledge and material contribu-
tion, and that the Sony defense was not available to the corporation."'
The Ninth Circuit next turned to the vicarious liability claim. By looking to
Gershwin, the court noted that one can be held vicariously liable if he "has the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct finan-
cial interest in such activities."'' Here, Napster had a financial interest in the
infringing activity because its software's ability to copy and transfer copy-
righted music was the main attraction of their website, for which the company
received profit.0 2 Napster had the "right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity" because, as stated on its website, it had the right to end a user's access
to the website for any cause.0 3 Second, Napster had control over its users
when it was clear that Napster had the ability to police its network and combat
infringement by blocking infringing users' access to Napster. °4 Based on these
facts, the court held in favor of the plaintiffs, finding defendant Napster vicari-
94 Id.
95 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1022. ("The record supports the district court's finding that Napster has actual
knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system, that it could block
access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the
material.").
98 Id.
99 Id. ("Napster is an integrated service designed to enable users to locate and download
MP3 music files ...[and] Napster provides the 'site and facilities' for direct infringe-
ment.").
100 Id.
101 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
102 Id. at 1023.
103 Id. at 1022, 1023.
104 Id. at 1023.
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ously liable for copyright infringement."'
B. In re Aimster Copyright Litig.
After Napster I the next judicial examination of P2P technologies came
from the Seventh Circuit via In re Aimster Copyright Litigation."6 Aimster's
technology differed from that of Napster in that it was "built on top of an exist-
ing peer-to-peer network ... [and] adds a searchable database of files available
on the network .*..'"" Aimster's users could only exchange files when more
than one party was online and individuals wanting to exchange files were
linked in a chat room via an instant messaging service. 8 Aimster's server col-
lected and organized information obtained from its users, but it did not make
copies of the exchanged files. 9 Aimster's software appears to have operated a
"central database index" based on the limited facts presented in the case." 0
Again, the recording industry brought suit against the creators of Aimster for
contributory infringement and vicarious liability."' Addressing contributory
infringement, the Seventh Circuit found that "constructive knowledge" is suf-
ficient to satisfy the knowledge element required for contributory infringe-
ment."2 Specifically, the defendant here could not "escape liability by ... us-
105 Id. at 1023-24. Defendant Napster tried to use the Sony defense in response to the
vicarious liability claim. Id. at 1022. However, the court here found that although the "lines
between direct infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn," the Sony defense
only applies to contributory infringement claims, and not vicarious liability claims. Id. at
1022; see also Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), 435 n. 17.
106 See generally Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. 111. 2002); Aimster II, 334 F.3d
643 (7th Cir. 2003).
107 Feder, supra note 21, at 884.
108 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 646. When the user is ready to copy and exchange a file:
Aimster's server searches the computers of those users of its software who are online
and so are available to be searched for files they are willing to share, and if it finds the
file that has been requested it instructs the computer in which it is housed to transmit
the file to the recipient via the Internet for him to download into his computer.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Feder, supra note 21, at 884.
I Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642, 649-55. Similar to Napster I and I Aimster
could not be held liable for direct infringement because the reproductions of the files were
stored on individual users' computers. Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 646. And so, secondary
theories of liability were alleged. Id. at 638.
112 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650 ("We also reject Aimster's argument that because the
Court said in Sony that mere 'constructive knowledge' of infringing uses is not enough for
contributory infringement ... Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law..."). The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois performed a different analysis with
regards to the knowledge element. Aimster I, 252 Supp. at 650. Specifically, the lower
court found that Aimster had knowledge when it received actual notice from the sound re-
cording industry of the infringing activities: the Aimster website included a tutorial on how
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ing encryption software to prevent himself from learning what surely he
strongly suspect[ed] to be the case: that the users of his service - maybe all the
users of his service- are copyright infringers.""' 3
The Seventh Circuit did not perform an analysis of the "material contribu-
tion" element of contributory infringement, rather it focused primarily on the
Sony defense being asserted by the defendant. "4 Defendant Aimster argued the
Sony defense to contributory infringement that its P2P technology is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses."5 Judge Posner, however, found that the ap-
propriate question of the Sony defense is not whether the product is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses, but rather how probable are those non-
infringing uses."6 Here, Aimster was not able to adequately defend itself be-
cause its product was not used for non-infringing purposes, thus the court
found it contributory liable." 7
The Seventh Circuit was more hesitant than its lower court in finding Aim-
ster vicariously liable." 8 The District Court found vicarious liability because
Aimster had the right and ability to supervise its users when, like Napster, it
posted its own Terms of Service that notified users that they must remove
copyrighted material from the site, and that repeat offenders of downloading
copyrighted material would likely be blocked from Aimster services."9 The
District Court found that Aimster met the second direct financial interest ele-
ment of vicarious liability, because Aimster charged users a monthly fee to use
the Grokster software and they used the copyrighted material as a marketing
tool to attract users to use its service. 20
to use its software that used a copyrighted song as an example; the website's chat rooms and
bulletin boards made it clear that the site was a new substitution for Napster in downloading
copyrighted material; and there was a designated section on the website to provide users
with an easy way to locate copyrighted materials. Id. at 650.
"13 Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 650.
114 Id. at 646-54; see also Aimster I, 252 F. Supp.3d at 651-52 (detailing the District
Court's material contribution analysis).
"15 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 647.
116 Id. at 653.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 654.
[W]e are less confident than the district judge that the recording industry would also be
likely to prevail on the issue of vicarious infringement ... Vicarious liability has been
extended in the copyright area to cases in which the only effective relief is obtainable
from someone who bears a relation to the direct infringers that is analogous to the rela-
tion of a principal to an agent ... How far the doctrine of vicarious liability extends is
uncertain ... [W]e shall not have to resolve our doubts in order to decide the appeal.
Id.
"19 Aimster 1, 252 F. Supp.2d at 654-55.
120 Id. at 654-55.
The financial benefit element is also satisfied where, as here, the existence of infring-
ing activities act as a draw for potential customers ... Aimster's bulletin boards and
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C. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.: "0 Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou
Romeo?"' 2'
The Napster and Aimster decisions had the same end result: the P2P soft-
ware distributors were found secondary liable for the direct infringement of its
users. ' Though the opinion used similar P2P technology, the analysis in the
Grokster decisions led to different results than those previous cases. Grokster
P2P software emerged using "supernode" technology, where a chosen group of
nodes on a network are used as indexing servers.'23 Grokster users search files
by "connect[ing] with the most easily accessible supernode, which conducts
the search of its index and supplies the user with the results."' 24 The user is
then able to transfer the resulting file onto her computer.
25
In Grokster I and H, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia and Ninth Circuit concurred in their results, but differed in their reason-
ing, leading to a controversial intra-circuit split.'26 The District Court found
that in order to be held liable for contributory infringement, the alleged con-
tributory infringer "[m]ust have actual knowledge of specific infringement at a
time when they can use that knowledge to stop the particular infringement."'
27
Although there was overwhelming evidence that Grokster had actual knowl-
edge, the District Court relied heavily on when they acquired that knowledge.1
28
chat rooms are replete with examples of users drawn there simply because they know it
is a place where they can obtain infringing material.
Id.
121 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. For purposes of this Note,
Grokster software was temporarily downloaded. A search for Shakespeare produced one hit
for a Shakespeare in Love movie poster, while searches for (copyrighted) songs by
Madonna, Britney Spears, and Ashlee Simpson brought up several hits.
122 See discussion infra Parts I1l.A, II.B.
123 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159. Nodes have been defined as an, "[e]nd point of a net-
work connection ... [or] any device connected to a network such as file servers, printers, or
workstations." TECHFEST, TECHFEST NETWORK CABLING GLOSSARY, at
http://www.techfest.com/networking/cabling/cableglos.htm (last visited March 15, 2005).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1160.
126 See generally id; see also Grokster II, 380 F.3d 1154.
127 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1037 (emphasis added). The District Court rejected the
plaintiffs argument that constructive knowledge of the infringing activity is sufficient; in-
stead, holding actual knowledge is required. Id.
128 Id. The District Court could have been found based on the following facts: (1) Grok-
ster referred to itself as "the Next Napster," (2) its executives searched and found copy-
righted material when they used their product, (3) the music recording industry plaintiffs
gave Grokster notice of the infringing activities, and (4) internal documents showed that
Grokster was aware of its' users' infringement activities. Id. at 1036-38.
Here, it is undisputed that Defendants are generally aware that many of their users em-
ploy Defendants' software to infringe copyrighted works ... The question, however, is
whether actual knowledge of specific infringement accrues at a time when either De-
fendant materially contributes to the alleged infringement, and can therefore do some-
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Because the District Court found that Grokster gained knowledge after the
point in which the computer system operator could do something to stop its
users from infringing, Grokster was deemed not to have had actual knowl-
edge.'29 Nonetheless, the District Court found that Grokster could use the Sony
defense to having actual knowledge of its users' direct infringement. 3 ° Just as
VTRs were capable of substantial noninfringing use in Sony, the District Court
found in Grokster that "it is undisputed that there are substantial noninfringing
uses for Defendants' software - e.g., distributing movie trailers, free songs or
other non-copyrighted works; using the software in countries where it is legal;
or sharing the works of Shakespeare.''. Similar to Sony, the court here did not
substantiate how much noninfringing use was required to be "substantial," and
essentially ignored the allegation that over 90% of the works being copied and
distributed with Grokster software were copyrighted.'32
Addressing the second element of contributory infringement, material con-
tribution, the District Court looked to whether the alleged infringer provided
the "site and facilities" for the direct infringement.'33 Here, the District Court
found that Grokster did not materially contribute.'34 Grokster did nothing more
than distribute software, which performed searches and transferred files
through computers controlled or owned by Grokster 33 Thus, the District
Court found no contributory infringement on the part of Grokster.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the California Central District's finding of no
liability for Grokster, but under different reasoning. The appellate level deci-
thing about it.
Id. at 1038.
129 Id. at 1036-37 (citing Napster II).
We agree that if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material
available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator
knows of and contributes to direct infringement" . .. Defendants correctly point out
that in order to be liable under a theory of contributory infringement, they must have
actual knowledge of infringement at a time when they can use that knowledge to stop
the particular infringement. In other words, Plaintiffs' notices of infringing conduct are
irrelevant if they arrive when Defendants do nothing to facilitate, and cannot do any-
thing to stop, the alleged infringement.
Id.
130 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1035.
131 Id. (emphasis added).
132 Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1035; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158 ("The Copyright
Owners allege that over 90% of the files exchanged through use of the "peer-to-peer" file-
sharing software offered by... [Grokster] involves copyrighted material ..."); Sony Corp.
of Am., 464 U.S. at 442 ("[l]n order to resolve this case we need not give precise content to
the question of how much use is commercially significant."); see also Grokster I, 259 F.
Supp.2d at 1041 (discussing StreamCast's technology and its potential contributory in-
fringement liability.).
133 Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1039-40.
134 Id. at 1040-1043.
135 Id. at 1040.
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sion reiterated the two theories of secondary copyright lability: contributory
infringement and vicarious liability.'36 The appeals court provided an analysis
of the contributory copyright infringement elements of i knowledgei and i ma-
terial contribution.i "' However, it stated that the requisite level of knowledge
must first be determined before the court can determine whether the defendant
had knowledge.'38 The court stated:
If the product at issue is not capable of substantial or commercially significant uses, then
the copyright owner need only show that the defendant had constructive knowledge of the
infringement. On the other hand, if the product at issue is capable of substantial or com-
mercially significant noninfringing uses, then the copyright owner must demonstrate that
the defendant had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and failedto act on
that knowledge to prevent infringement.
139
The Ninth Circuit echoed the District Courtis ruling that the product here is
icapable of substantial noninfringing uses.i" ° First, some copyright authors
consent to their works being swapped on Grokster, and second, public domain
works are often shared through Grokster.'4 ' After finding Grokster was capa-
ble of such substantial noninfringing uses, the Ninth Circuit held that i reason-
able knowledge of specific infringementi is required. "2
With regard to reasonable knowledge, the plaintiffs here gave Grokster aW-
tual notices of the infringing activities, but the court deemed that such notice
was given too late in the process.'43 There was nothing the defendants could do
at that point to stop the infringement that had already taken place.'" Addition-
ally, Grokster did not maintain a central index of available files.' 5 In fact, if
136 Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1157, 1160.
137 Id. at 1160-64. Although the court notes that there are three elements to be analyzed
in copyright infringement cases, the first being idirect infringementi, it did not perform a
direct infringement analysis seemingly because it relied on the District Courtis finding re-
garding direct infringement. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1034-35.
138 Id. at 1161 (iThus, in order to analyze the required element of knowledge of in-
fringement, we must first determine what level of knowledge to require.i).
139 Id. (first, second, and fourth emphasis added).
140 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161 (citing Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1035).
41 Id. at 1161, 1162 n. 10 (ilndeed, even at a 10% level of legitimate use .. . the volume
of use would in-dicate a minimum of hundreds of thousands of legitimate file exchanges.i).
The court offered the example of the band Wilco who bought back the rights to their al-
bums, made it available for transfer through P2P and the interest that resulted led them to
another contract deal. Id. at 1161.
142 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161-63.
143 Id. at 1162 (citing Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1030) (i[T]he Copyright Owners
were required to establish that the Software Distributors had 6specific knowledge of h-
fringement at a time at which they contributed to the infringement, and failed to act upon
that information.i); see also id. at 1163 (i Plaintiffsi notices of infringing conduct are ir-
relevant,i because they arrive when Defendants do nothing to facilitate, and cannot do any-
thing to stop, the alleged infrin~menti of specific copyrighted content.i).
144 See id. at 1162.
145 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
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the software distributors "closed their doors and deactivated all computers
within their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with
little or no interruption."'46 In addition to finding no knowledge, the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed with the District Court and did not find material contribution.'47
The defendants did not provide the "site and facilities" for infringement, be-
cause file indices did not rest on Grokster computers and Grokster did not have
the ability to terminate user accounts. 148
Finally, both courts agreed there was no vicarious liability. 49 Although it
was clear that Grokster reaped a financial benefit from the infringement, vis-A-
vis advertising revenue, Grokster did not have the "right and ability to super-
vise the direct infringers."'' ° Specifically, no licensing agreement or policy
stated that defendants had such control over their users, nor any evidence that
the defendants had the ability to control their users or block access to users."'
The entertainment industry then made the "blind eye" argument that was origi-
nally made in Aimster 11, and mentioned in Napster 11, by claiming that ignor-
ing "detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liabil-
ity."52 The Ninth Circuit in Grokster 1H disregarded the theory, stating that
although that idiom has been used from time to time, "there is no separate
'blind eye' theory or element of vicarious liability that exists independently of
the traditional elements of liability.' ' 53
In sum, the Ninth Circuit did not find Grokster liable for contributory in-
fringement or vicariously liability.'54 Despite all of the common law doctrinal
progress made between the Napster 1 and Aimster I1 decisions, the Grokster
decisions manipulated the elements of contributory and vicarious infringement
in such a way that allowed Grokster to continue to operate.'55 The courts have
allowed Grokster to continue in its original form, despite the credible allega-
tion that over 90% of the files shared through its software were copyrighted,
despite Grokster's knowledge and contribution to the infringement of its users,
and despite the remarkably similar fact patterns in the Napster and Aimster
146 Id. (quoting Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1041).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1165-66; see also Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1043-46.
150 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1164.
15' Id. at 1164-65 ("The sort of monitoring and supervisory relationship that has sup-
ported vicarious liability in the past is completely absent in this case.").
152 Id. at 1166 (quoting Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023); see also Aimster II, 334 F.3d at
650 ("Willful blindness is knowledge in copyright (where indeed it may be enough that the
defendant should have known of the direct infringement), as it is in the law generally.")
(citations omitted).
153 Id. at 1166.
154 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1160-67.
'5' See discussion infra Part Ill.
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decisions.'56
V. THE INCONSISTENCIES OF APPLYING SONYTO P2P
TECHNOLOGY
A. Sony Must be Overturned Due to its Lack of Clarity and Consistency
The Sony decision is fundamentally flawed in its holding. First, the Su-
preme Court states that "the lines between direct infringement, contributory
infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.""' In fact, the
Court uses the terms "contributory infringement" and "vicarious liability" in-
terchangeably. 5 The Court should have incorporated Gershwin in its Sony
decision. Gershwin clearly stated the two separate theories of secondary liabil-
ity in copyright infringement cases: contributory infringement and vicarious
liability. 59 The Gershwin case unmistakably sets out the elements of each the-
ory. 6° Contributory infringement occurs when "one who, with knowledge of
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infring-
ing conduct of another... ""' Vicarious liability occurs when an individual
"has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a di-
rect financial interest in such activities. '
Second, because the Court does not properly present and analyze the ele-
ments of contributory infringement and vicarious liability, it is unclear how the
Sony defense should apply in copyright infringement cases. The Court does
not state whether the defense is in response to the contributory infringement
theory as a whole, as suggested by Aimster II, or whether it applies to the sin-
gle element of knowledge, as suggested by the Napster H and Grokster II
courts.63 Regardless, the Napster, Aimster, and Grokster courts are being
forced to apply a defense to elements never outlined in Sony.'6 4 The Sony
anomaly has led to varying analyses and results in the inconsistent P2P hold-
156 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158.
157 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. at 435 n. 17 (1984).
158 Id. at 437 (stating that vicarious liability can be imposed when the contributory in-
fringer is in "a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others and had authorized
the use without permission from the copyright owner.").
159 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, at 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also Sony Revisited, supra note 67 (discussing Justice O'Connor's concern
that Gershwin was one of the few cases which defined contributory infringement).
160 Gershwin Publ'g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162.
161 Id. at 1162 (footnote omitted).
162 Id.
163 See Aimster I1, 334 F.3d at 646-65; see also discussion infra Part I.B; Napster I,
239 F.3d at 1020-221.




B. Secondary Liability Inconsistencies
Regardless of Sony's deficiency in parsing out the theories of secondary li-
ability, or its deficiency in showing how to apply its newly created defense, the
P2P courts have struggled to apply the Gershwin elements and the Sony de-
fense. 6 6 At first glance, the Gershwin elements of contributory infringement,
"knowledge" and "material contribution", and vicarious liability, "right and
ability to supervise" and "direct financial interest", seem simple enough to ap-
ply to the varying technologies. However, despite the strikingly similar fact
patterns before the Napster, Aimster, and Grokster courts, each court has ap-
plied the law differently.
67
1. Contributory Infringement Inconsistencies: The Knowledge Element.
The Ninth Circuit in Napster held that the defendants had knowledge when
the music recording industry gave Napster actual notices of the infringing ac-
tivities occurring through their website and software. 68 In Grokster, however,
the same Ninth Circuit held that the actual notices the plaintiffs delivered to
Grokster were not knowledge. 69 In fact, the Grokster H court arbitrarily added
to the knowledge element that the defendants had "specific knowledge of in-
fringement at a time at which they contribute[d] to the infringement, and []
fail[ed] to act upon that information."'7 ° The facts in the Grokster and Napster
decisions are remarkably similar to that of Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction,
165 See discussion infra Parts ll.A, Ill.B, III.C.
166 See Feder's discussion of an element-lacking analysis by the Sony court. Feder, supra
note 21, at 875; see also discussion infra Parts Il.A, I11.B, III.C.
167 See discussion infra Parts IlA, Ill.B, II1.C.
168 Napster 1, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5; see also Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (noting
that the District Court in Aimster found similar notices to be knowledge).
169 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162.
170 Id. (citing Napster II 239 F.3d at 1021) (alteration in original). Although the Grokster
court is attempting to interpret Napster I1, Napster stated:
[F]or the operator to have sufficient knowledge, the copyright holder must "provide the
necessary documentation to show there is likely infringement" ... We agree that if a
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system
and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes
to direct infringement. Conversely, absent any specific information which identifies
infringing activity, a computer system, operator cannot be liable for contributory in-
fringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copy-
righted material.
Id. Thus, if the notices of actual infringing activities that Napster received were similar to
those given to Grokster, such notice should be sufficient to show that the defendants had
knowledge, satisfying that element of contributory infringement. Id.
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Inc., where the operators of a flea market were contributory liable because they
had knowledge when the local sheriff gave the operators a letter detailing the
ongoing infringing activities that were taking place at their market.171 Yet, the
Ninth Circuit in Grokster H appears to have ignored precedent within its own
circuit.1
7 1
Second, the Ninth Circuit in Napster found that the defendants had knowl-
edge because of the internal company documents that showed that its execu-
tives knew of the infringing activities of its users.'7 In Grokster I, however, a
similar document was evidenced, but the court did not find that this amounted
to knowledge.'74 The District Court in Grokster stated "that various internal
documents reveal Defendants were aware that their users were infringing copy-
rights ... Here, it is undisputed that Defendants are generally aware that many
of their users employ Defendants' software to infringe copyrighted works."
Regardless, the Grokster I court held in favor of the Defendants, and in Grok-
ster II, the court does not address the internal documents specifically in its dis-
cussion of the knowledge element.
Third, there is disagreement among the P2P decisions as to the degree of
knowledge required. Sony stated that "mere 'constructive knowledge' of in-
fringing uses is not enough for contributory infringement.""' The Napster H
court, however, was accepting of constructive knowledge - it found contribu-
tory infringement if the alleged infringer knows or should have known of the
direct infringement by its users.'76 Napster H also stated that the Defendant
had actual knowledge of the direct infringement.'77 In A imster H, Judge Posner
held that a willful blind eye is the equivalent of knowledge in copyright law
'1 See generally Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
Fonovisa is a recent Ninth Circuit case where contributory infringement and vicarious liabil-
ity were alleged and found in facts similar to the P2P cases. Id.
172 Id.
173 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-22 ("[T]he evidentiary record here supported the district
court's finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that Napster knew or had
reason to know of its users' infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights."); see also Napster I, 114
F. Supp.2d at 918,
Plaintiffs present convincing evidence that Napster executives actually knew about and
sought to protect use of the service to transfer illegal MP3 files. For example, a docu-
ment authored by co-founder Sean Parker mentions the need to remain ignorant of us-
ers' real names and IP addresses 'since they are exchanging pirated music.
Id.
174 Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1036-38; see also Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1160-63.
'75 See discussion of Sony Corp. of Am. in In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643,
650 (7th Cir. 2003). Sony states that in order to be held contributory liable, it would have to
rely on the constructive knowledge that Sony knew its product was being used to infringe
copyrights. Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 439.




and elsewhere. 7 He stated that, "[o]ne who, knowing or strongly suspecting
that he is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not
acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings is
held to have . . . [knowledge]."' 79 Yet in Grokster II, the court created an en-
tirely new standard for determining the requisite level of knowledge. 8 ° Rest-
ing on the Sony defense, the Ninth Circuit in Grokster stated that if the product
was capable of substantial noninfringing uses, "reasonable knowledge" is suf-
ficient, and if the product is not capable of such uses, "constructive knowl-
edge" is required.''
2. Contributory Infringement Inconsistencies: The Material Contribution
Element.
These P2P decisions have been extraordinarily inconsistent as to what con-
stitutes knowledge, and what level of knowledge is required of an alleged in-
fringer and clarification is needed.'82 The same is true for the second element
of contributory infringement, material contribution.'83 The Ninth Circuit has
been unreliable in its application of the material contribution element of con-
tributory infringement.'84 In Napster II, the Ninth Circuit found that the plain-
tiff materially contributed to the direct infringement of its users.'85 Similar to
Fonovisa, Napster provided the "site and facilities" for the direct infringement
when it provided the public with its software."86 In Grokster 11 however, the
court found that the defendant did not materially contribute when it provided
the public with software similar to that in the Napster cases.'87 The Grokster H
court reasoned that because the infringing files did not reside on Grokster's
computers and the company did not have the ability to control users' accounts,
Grokster did not provide the "site and facilities" to amount to material contri-
bution.'88
These P2P decisions demonstrate that courts have routinely misapplied the
178 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650.
179 Id. (citing United States v. Giovannatti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990)).
180 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1161.
181 Id. As previously mentioned, the Grokster court found the product capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses and so the Defendant must have "reasonable knowledge" to be
liable for contributory infringement. Id. at 1161-62.
182 See discussion infra Part IV.B.i.
183 See discussion infra Part IV.B.ii.
184 See discussion infra Part IV.B.ii.
185 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022.
186 Id.
187 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163.
188 1,4
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elements of contributory infringement to varying P2P technologies) 9 Unfor-
tunately, these inconsistencies have allowed some P2P technologies to con-
tinue to exist in their current forms, resulting in unrelenting copyright in-
fringement by their users. 9 °
3. The Inconsistencies of the Sony Defense to Contributory Infringement
Most of the confusion within the P2P decisions lies with the Sony holding
and its defense to contributory infringement. 9 ' First, the Supreme Court is
inconsistent in stating the exact standard it wished to apply. In one instance, it
imported language from the Patent Act to create the Sony defense: "the sale of
a 'staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfring-
ing use' is not contributory infringement."'92 In another instance the Court
stated, "[an) article[] of commerce[] does not constitute contributory infringe-
ment if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes." 193
In yet another variation of the same defense, the Court stated "[i]ndeed it need
merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses".' 94 The Court went on to
say "[t]he question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially
significant noninfringing uses."' 95 The Court stated that in order to resolve the
former question, not all of the potential uses must be explored; rather only an
examination as to whether a "significant number" of the uses would be nonin-
fringing is necessary.' 96 In concluding its discussion of the defense, the Su-
preme Court stated its last version of the standard: "[t]he Betamax is, therefore,
capable of substantial noninfringing uses ... [and] Sony's sale of such equip-
ment to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of
respondents' copyrights."' 97 By failing to state a concrete definition of the con-
tributory infringement defense, the Supreme Court paved the way for the in-
consistent holdings of the Napster, A imster, and Grokster decisions.
Second, Sony neglects to provide a way to measure "substantial noninfring-
189 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
190 See Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Senator Hatch). Filesharing networks will
infringe approximately 12 to 24 billion pieces of copyrighted materials in 2004. Id.
19 See discussion infra Part II.C.
192 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984) (quoting
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §271(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
193 Id. at 442 (emphasis added) ("Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the
sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the prod-
uct is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.").
194 Id.
'95 Id. (emphases added).
196 Id.
197 Id. at 456.
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ing uses."'98 Courts currently have no basis to determine how to weigh usage,
or how much usage is sufficient to be deemed "substantial." As a result, courts
such as Grokster I and II, have arbitrarily found that a mere 10% of legitimate
use is sufficient to qualify as "substantial noninfringing uses,"'99 thus permit-
ting a rampantly infringing product to remain on the market.
Third, the P2P decisions have varied in deciphering if the standard is
whether the product is "capable" of substantial noninfringing uses or alterna-
tively the "probability" that the product will be used for substantial noninfring-
ing uses. In interpreting Sony's variation of the defense, the Napster 1I court
asked whether the product is capable of substantial noninfringing uses."° In
Aimster H, however, Judge Posner found that the question is how probable are
the substantial noninfringing uses.2"' Judge Posner stated that to hold other-
wise, "the seller of a product or service used solely to facilitate copyright in-
fringement ... would be immune from liability for contributory infringement.
That would be an extreme result, and one not envisaged by the Sony major-
ity."2°2 In fact, Judge Posner's depiction of this result became a reality in
Grokster II, when the court rejected Judge Posner's "probability" standard. -0 3
The Grokster I court instead followed the "capable" doctrine, finding that the
software was capable of substantial noninfringing uses even though it was al-
leged that over ninety percent of files swapped had copyright protection. 4
198 Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 442 ("[I]n order to resolve this case we need not give
precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant. For one poten-
tial use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this standard..."). It is arguable, then, to surmise
that less than one legitimate use would not be deemed substantial. Id.
199 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158, 1162.
In this case, the Software Distributors have not only shown that their products are ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses, but that the uses have commercial viability...
Indeed, even at a 10% level of legitimate, as contended by the Copyright Owners, the
volume of use would indicate a minimum of hundreds of thousands of legitimate file
exchanges.
Id. The District Court found "distributing movie trailers, free songs or other non-
copyrighted works; using the software in countries where it is legal; or sharing the works of
Shakespeare" as legitimate file sharing. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1035.
200 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-21.
201 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 653.
202 Id. at 651.
203 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162.
204 Id. In rejecting the Aimster H court's reasoning:
We are mindful that the Seventh Circuit has read Sony's substantial noninfringing use
standard differently. It determined that an important additional factor is how 'prob-
able' the noninfringing uses of a product are. The Copyright Owners urge us to adopt
the Aimster rationale. However, Aimster is premised specifically on a fundamental dis-
agreement with Napster l's reading of Sony-Betamax. We are not free to reject our
own Circuit's binding precedent (citations omitted).
Id. at 1162. The court relies on plaintiffs claims that 10% of the files shared were not copy-
righted.
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In summary, Sony did not set forth precise and consistent language for
courts to follow. It stated several varying versions of its defense, resulting in
inconsistent contributory infringement decisions. In addition, assuming that
the standard is whether the product is capable of substantially noninfringing
uses, the Court has not provided any guidance as to how to measure "substan-
tial." More significantly, there is disagreement within the circuits as to
whether the standard should include "capable" or "probable" language. As a
result, software distributors such as Grokster continue to operate, even though
more than ninety percent of the works being shared on their service are likely
copyrighted."'
4. Vicarious Liability Inconsistencies: The Right and Ability to Supervise the
Direct Infringement.0 6
Just as contributory infringement has been inconsistently applied in P2P
cases, vicarious liability has also created a great deal of confusion."7 The Nap-
ster I court found that the defendant had the right and ability to supervise its
users' conduct when it began to police its network in preventing the exchange
of copyrighted material.0 In Grokster II, the same Ninth Circuit found just the
opposite based on similar facts. 29 Also in Napster II, the court stated that,
In this case, the Software Distributors have not only shown that their products are ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses, but that the uses have commercial viability...
Indeed, even at a 10% level of legitimate, as contended by the Copyright Owners, the
volume of use would indicate a minimum of hundreds of thousands of legitimate file
exchanges.
Id.
205 Id. at 1158.
206 In both Napster H and Grokster H, the courts found that the second element vicarious
liability, direct financial benefit, is indisputable because both companies reap(ed) a financial
gain resulting from advertising revenue. See Napster iI, 239 F.3d at 1023 (stating that
"[flinancial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material 'acts as a 'draw' for
customers."'); Grokster II, 380 F. 3d at 1164 (reasoning that "[t]he element ... of a direct
financial benefit, via advertising revenue, are undisputed in this case."). As such, it will not
be discussed further in this Note as an element that needs specific clarification - the P2P
cases have not applied this element inconsistently. Id.
207 Sony states that vicarious liability was not before the Court. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17 (1984).
208 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023.
209 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1165-66. Despite evidence that showed Grokster's software
could be altered to police the network, the court did not find this sufficient to rise to having
the "right and ability" to supervise the direct infringement of its users:
The district court correctly characterized the Copyright Owners' evidence of the right
and ability to supervise as little more than a contention that "the software itself could
be altered to prevent users from sharing copyrighted files." In arguing that this ability
constitutes evidence of the right and ability to supervise, the Copyright Owners confuse
the right and ability to supervise with the strong duty imposed on entities that have al-
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"[t]urning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit
gives rise to liability."2 ' Nonetheless, in Grokster II, the court used the same
argument as it applied to vicarious liability and flatly rejected the plaintiffs
argument that turning a blind eye to infringement is applicable to vicarious
infringement as evidence of the right and ability to supervise.2 '
Unfortunately, Sony does not offer any guidance in this arena because the is-
sue was not before the Court, thus leaving the Ninth Circuit free to disagree as
to whether the "blind eye" theory is applicable to vicarious liability, contribu-
tory infringement, or both." 2 Not only are there several splits between the cir-
cuits as to whether P2P software companies are contributory or vicariously
liable, there are several intra-circuit splits concerning the secondary liability
theories of copyright law. The circuit and intra-circuit splits beg for new sec-
ondary liability standards.
VI. A NEW STANDARD
With the inconsistencies and splits of the P2P courts, a new standard for
secondary liability must be enacted by Congress. No time is better than the
present. The music industry is suffering tremendously because of P2P tech-
nologies. 23 New technologies arise virtually every day, and Congress is al-
ready contemplating legislation in this arena where a new standard should ap-
ply.2 4 This new standard should be technology neutral and ensure those who
take advantage of copyrighted works would be held liable. 215 At the same time,
the new standard should protect important, legitimate products, whose sole
business model does not rely on the copyright infringement of its users.2t6
ready been determined to be liable for vicarious copyright infringement; such entities
have an obligation to exercise their policing powers to the fullest extent, which in Nap-
ster's case included implementation of new filtering mechanisms.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
2 10 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023. Although the Napster II decision found the willful
blind eye approach applicable to vicarious liability, the Aimster II court held that a willful
blind eye is the equivalent of knowledge, pertaining to contributory infringement. See Aim-
ster II, 334 F.3d at 650.
211 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1166 ("[T]here is no separate 'blind eye' theory or element of
vicarious liability that exists independently of the traditional elements of liability.").
212 Id.; see also Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021; Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1036.
213 Hearings, supra note 8; Graham, supra note 8.
214 Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. §g (2004).
215 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Senator Hatch).
216 Id.
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A. Why a New Standard Must be Enacted - P2P's Disastrous Effects on the
Entertainment Industry.
One may ask why a new standard is needed. After all, two out of the three
major P2P cases held in favor of the content owners. Mitch Bainwol, Chair-
man and CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America, made the
reason crystal clear:
[T]he music industry has been devastated by worldwide piracy. In 2000, the top ten hits
sold 60 million units in the U.S .... in 2003, the top ten hits were cut almost in half, to 33
million units . . . [t]his slide has been caused predominantly by illicit P2P . . . services,
where these top ten hits and other valuable content are offered to users - unauthorized and
for free.217
Bainwol went on to say how ubiquitous the infringement has become, "A
recent academic study estimated that almost a billion illegal downloads take
place each and every month. Four of the top ten downloaded applications on
the Internet are P2P programs operated by companies who purposefully profit
from illegal conduct.
21 8
In addition, the Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA") recently
announced its decision to "file hundreds of lawsuits . . . against individuals
who swap pirated copies of movies over the Internet."'2 9 Although the MPAA
does not currently have a prediction of the industry's losses due to online pi-
racy, it estimated that in the month of October 2004 alone, more than 44 mil-
lion digital files of "full-length feature films were being shared on peer-to-peer
networks ... "220
Despite the doctrinal progress made in the Napster and Aimster decisions,
the result in Grokster H begs reform and modernization of the copyright law.
P2P software distributors, whose products' business models appear to rely
solely on the infringement of its users, are being sustained in the marketplace
when it has been alleged that over ninety percent of swapped files are copy-
righted.221 As a result, copyright infringement is widespread, devastating both
the music recording and entertainment industries.222 The courts in the P2P de-
cisions have failed to adequately remedy the problem and Congressional action
is required to stem the tide.
217 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Mitch Bainwol).
218 Id.
219 Movie Studios to Sue File Swappers, MSNBC.com, at http://www.ms-
nbc.msn.com/id!6402656 (Nov. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Movie Studios]; see also Francavillo,
supra note 3 (discussing the music recording industry's efforts to sue individual users for
copyright infringement due to their lack of success in Grokster).
220 Movie Studios, supra note 219.
22! Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158.
222 Hearings, supra note 8; see also Graham, supra note 8.
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B. Why Congress Must Enact Legislation Rather than Allowing the Courts to
Resolve the Problem
The Grokster H decision virtually begs Congress to step in and remedy the
flaws associated with copyright infringement's secondary liability theories.
The District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grokster I and II
explicitly plead for Congressional action."3 In the former, the District Court
stated that it is not ignorant of the possibility that Grokster may have purpose-
fully created a business model to avoid liability for contributory infringe-
ment.2 4 It goes on to state that "[w]hile the Court need not decide whether
steps could be taken to reduce the susceptibility of such software to unlawful
use . . . additional legislative guidance may be well-counseled. 2 2' 5 The Court
of Appeals was more emphatic when it observed that courts are ill-prepared to
police the rapid technological advancements of Internet innovations.26 The
court stated that the responsibility of monitoring new technology has been left
primarily to Congress.2 2 ' Article I of the Constitution signals Congress to de-
termine the scope of copyright liability.2 2 8
This deference to Congress to make changes to the copyright law in light of
new technologies is supported in Sony:
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors
in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product ... From its beginning,
the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology...
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.
229
The courts continue to be reluctant to expand copyright protections without
"explicit legislative guidance. '23" Therefore, Congress must enact legislation
that will prevent more decisions like that of Grokster.
C. Current Legislation - S. 2560, the Induce Act
Even before Grokster was decided on appeal, Senators Hatch, Leahy, Frist,
223 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1046; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1167.
224 Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1046 ("The Court is not blind to the possibility that
Defendants may have intentionally structured their businesses to avoid secondary liability
for copyright infringement, while benefiting [sic] financially from the illicit draw of their
wares.").
225 Id.
226 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1167.
227 Id. (relying on Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429-30,
431 (1984)).
228 Id.
229 Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 429-30, 431.
230 Id. at 431.
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Daschle, Graham and Boxer introduced the "Inducing Infringement of Copy-
rights Act of 2004" ("Induce Act") in June 2004.21 The legislation would add
part (g) to Section 501 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code:
Whoever intentionally induces any violation identified in subsection (a) shall be held liable
as an infringer . . . [and] the term 'intentionally induces' means intentionally aids, abets,
induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts from which a reasonable person
would find intent to induce to infringement based upon all relevant information about such
acts then reasonably available to the actor, including whether the activity relies on in-
fringement for its commercial viability.
232
The bill states, "[n]othing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish the
doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright infringement or
require any court to unjustly withhold or impose any secondary liability for
copyright infringement. '23 3 The Induce Act seeks to give copyright owners the
necessary tools to seek redress in the court system by codifying Gershwin's
inducing language and protecting the doctrines of vicarious liability and con-
tributory infringement.
2 34
The bill was in response to the District Court's decision in Grokster I, where
the court openly stated that Grokster may have "intentionally structured their
businesses to avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while bene-
fiting financially from the illicit draw of their wares. 233 In addition, the bill
was in response to the devastating effects online piracy has had on the music
and movie industry, with research showing that in 2004 filesharing networks
are expected to infringe approximately 12 to 24 billion pieces of copyrighted
materials. 236 The Induce Act language is remarkably similar to that of the Pat-
ent Act language: "the Patent Act expressly brands anyone who 'actively in-
duces infringement of a patent' as an infringer. 2 37 The Patent Act language
was seen by Senator Hatch as a "proven model [that] can address cases of in-
tent to induce infringement that were explicitly not covered or addressed by the
Supreme Court in Sony. 2 38 He intended the legislation to effect only distribu-




235 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1046.
236 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
237 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (quoting the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ I - 376 (2000)).
238 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch); see also Sony Revisited,
supra note 67 (providing a discussion about courts not applying the induce standard).
There is no reason to believe that the [Sony] Court meant to exclude inducement of in-
fringement from indirect infringement of copyright . . . [a]nd there is no reason to be-
lieve that Congress, when it adopted the Copyright Act of 1976, intended to overrule or
lessen the scope of contributory infringement stated in Gershwin, which explicitly in-




tors of products who intend to induce infringement:2 39 (1) the legislation is not
biased to one technology over another, (2) the legislation borrows sturdy lan-
guage from the Patent Act that would speak to products made with the intent to
induce infringement, which was not covered or contemplated by Sony, and (3)
existing contributory liability is sufficiently broad that the legislation here
would affect a small percentage of bad actors. 4 According to Senator Hatch,
the courts in the Napster and Grokster decisions were "distracted ... by raising
issues of non-infringing uses that should have been as irrelevant as they were
to the defendants' business plans. S. 2560 will end the confusion caused by
these flawed analyses. 24'
The sponsors of the legislation did not desire to alter or impede the other
two main theories of secondary liability, contributory infringement and vicari-
ous liability, when it included section three in the legislation.242 Rather, the
authors simply wanted to add, or essentially codify, the induce theory of sec-
ondary liability to copyright infringement law. 43 The "intent to induce" lan-
guage, seemingly novel to copyright law, is arguably a codification of existing,
but ignored law.2" Described as "[t]he classic statement of what constitutes
contributory infringement," the Gerswhin court stated that "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, cause or materially contributes
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' in-
fringer. '245 In fact, Justice O'Connor, the swing vote in Sony, reflected during
the Justices deliberations of Sony, on the Gershwin case; where it was her un-
derstanding that there were two ways to contributory infringe based on
Gershwin - either by inducing, or by materially contributing.2 46 In addition, the
Sony Court reiterated that inducing liability was not before it because Sony had




242 Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. §g (2004)
("Nothing in this subsection shall enlarge or diminish the doctrines of vicarious and con-
tributory liability for copyright infringement or require any court to unjustly withhold or
impose any secondary liability for copyright infringement.").
243 See Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Senator Hatch) ("Both then and now, the
prevailing rule for contributory infringement imposes liability upon anyone who knows or
has reason to know of infringing activity and induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another.").
244 Sony Revisited, supra note 67 at 1 1-12.
245 Lee Hollar, Liability for Inducement of Copyright Infringement: The Genie is Out of
the Bottle, J. OF INTERNET LAW, 18, 19 (2004) (referring to Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Co-
lumbia Artists Mgmt., Inc, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (emphasis added)).
246 Sony Revisited, supra note 67 at 11-12 (quoting Justice O'Connor's letter to Justice
Blackmun).
247 Hollar, supra note 245, at 19 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
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ally induce' its customers to make infringing uses of respondents' copyrights,
nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be en-
gaging in continuing infringement of respondents' copyrights. 24 8  However,
merely because the "induce issue" was not present in Sony, is no excuse not to
apply inducement liability; yet that is precisely what has occurred in copyright
law.249 Congressional action is thus needed to clarify this confused area of the
law so that inducing liability can be applied in the courts.
In addition to keeping intact the other two theories of secondary liability, the
bill's authors wished to keep the legislation technology neutral and behavior
targeted - a noteworthy goal because technology has changed over time and it
will continue to do so. 250 Legitimate technology companies such as Apple and
Sony, are concerned that based on the Induce Act, courts will find their pre-
sumably legitimate products, such as the iPod or TWo, as inducers. 5' How-
ever, the legislation does not seek to address technology that may be used to
infringe, rather it focuses on products and services whose intent it is to induce
the infringement of copyrights.25 2 Stated another way, the legislation is target-
ing products or services where their entire business model rests on the in-
fringement activity of their users.253
464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)).
248 Id.
249 See Sony Revisited, supra note 67 at 1 1 (discussing inducement liability already exist-
ing in copyright law, but ignored in the courts) ("No legislation and no change to Supreme
Court precedent appears necessary to add inducement of infringement to the collection of
tools available to protect copyrighted works.").
250 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Mitch Bainwol) (noting that the bill focuses on
behavior, not technology; on bad actors, i.e. those who have "hijacked technology" for their
own illegitimate purposes, and not on the technology itself).
251 See Declan McCullagh, Copyright Office Pitches Anti-P2P Bill, CNET NEws.coM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-53455 2 8.html (Sept. 2, 2004). In response to their con-
cerns about the scope of the Induce Act, the technology industry added to the S. 2560:
"mass, indiscriminate infringing conduct" and added the codification of Sony. Amol
Sharma, Technology Groups Propose Language to Narrow File-Sharing Bill, CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY, Aug. 24, 2004. This version also carved out ISP's, credit card compa-
nies and investments firms that are worried about being caught inadvertently in the legal net.
Id.
252 See Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. §g
(2004).
253 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Mitch Bainwol) ("It is imperative that Congress
insist on the rule of law and not accept a business model based on thievery."); see also id.
(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copy-
right Services, United States Copyright Office) (reiterating statements made in Grokster I,
Grokster's business plan may have been structured to get around the loophole in Napster I
and II) and that with S. 2560, courts would be permitted to look at "whether the defendant




D. The Induce Act's Inadequacies
The Induce Act is a good first step in reducing copyright infringement.
However, it may not be enough to better remedy the rampant infringement.
Specifically, software creators will once again find a way to dodge the spirit of
the copyright law. The Act's greatest strength, its adjusted Patent Act lan-
guage, may also be its greatest weakness. As stated by the Register of Copy-
rights, Mary Beth Peters,
While S. 2560 may provide courts with a useful and effective means of accessing the liabil-
ity of the current generation of infringing services, I am concerned that the next generation
of technology-based pirates will be able to devise a way around this new species of liabil-
ity. They may be able to limit evidence of their "inducement," yet still be able to reap sub-
stantial financial benefit from enabling and encouraging massive copyright infringement,just as Grokster ... [and others] appear to have devised a way around the Napster deci-
sion.5
For example, the 'inducing' language is the civil equivalent of criminal
law's "aiding and abetting," '255 and a defendant such as Grokster, could argue
that it had no intent to induce, aid, or abet the infringement of their users.
Rather, defendants could simply claim that they wanted to provide the public
with software that enables its users to transfer non-copyrighted files.
The legislation also is flawed in solely looking at the intent of the induce-
ment. Facts can easily cut both ways. For example, Grokster held itself out to
the public as "the Next Napster." '256 This could be a signal to potential users
that users can download copyrighted material, or a signal showing that the
company has figured out a legitimate way to comply with the law, where the
software is thus the new and improved legal version of Napster. Either way,
the current end result is a software product whose primary purpose is to allow
its users to infringe copyrights, where it has already been alleged that over
ninety percent of the material shared was copyrighted - Grokster.257
If no other measures can be agreed upon, the Induce Act should be enacted
because it is feasible that it would prevent future decisions like Grokster II. In
a footnote, the Sony Court states that Sony did not "induce" because it did not
"supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaging in
continuing infringement of respondents' copyrights." '258 Professor Lee Hollar
suggests that what Sony did not do in 1984, is exactly what Grokster H1 did in
2004.259 He argues that Grokster is supplying its software to users the company
knows to be participating in copyright infringement and that these acts of in-
254 Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
255 Sony Revisited, supra note 67 at 13 (citing Aimster 11, 334 F.3d 651).
256 Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1036 (internal citation omitted).
257 Grokster I1, 380 F.3d at 1158.
258 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 438-40 n. 19 (1984).
259 Hollar, supra note 245, at 19.
[Vol. 13
Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do?
ducement would give rise to liability under the Induce Act. 6 °
E. A Novel Approach
1. Recommendation #1: A New Form of Secondary Liability in Copyright
Infringement
Regardless of the possibility that the Induce Act may remedy the problems
at hand, Congress should enact a standard that would effectively combat the
current rampant copyright infringement activities stemming from P2P soft-
ware.26' This new standard should be behavior-driven, technology-neutral,
concise, and effective in holding liable individuals who purposefully dodge the
law and turn a blind eye to the infringement occurring through the use of their
product.26 2 Congress should enact a standard that would require courts to look
at (1) whether actual infringing use significantly outweighs non-infringing
use,2 63 (2) whether the product or service violates the spirit of the Copyright
Act by turning a blind eye to infringement,2 4 and (3) whether there is demon-
strable, significant, and deteriorating effect of the copyrighted material's use in
the market.2
6
The element of balancing actual infringing use with actual non-infringing
use is important because instead of focusing on mere possible uses, it focuses
on present, actual, infringement and non-infringement activities. A product
can be capable of millions of non-infringing uses, but if it is only being used in
the present for infringing purposes, it has no beneficial use in the market and
should not be maintained in its original form.266 The Sony dissent foreshad-
owed problems associated with looking at possible uses:
[]f a significant portion of the product's use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers
cannot be held contributorily liable for the product's infringing uses ... [but] [i]f virtually
all of the product's use, however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be imposed; if no
one would buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone, it is clear that the manufac-
turer is purposely profiting from the infringement, and that liability is appropriately im-
posed . . . [t]he key question is not the amount of. . . [content] that is copyrighted, but
260 Id.
261 Hearings, supra note 8.
262 Id.; see also Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650.
263 Feder, supra note 21; see also Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 653.
264 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650.
265 Francavillo, supra note 3 at 884 ("Perhaps it would be better for copyright law to
consider the effect that an alleged infringer's 'actions [have] had on the copyright holder's
opportunities for commercial exploitation.' This standard would hold P2P services, rather




rather the amount of. . . usage that is infringing.26 7
Although Judge Posner in the Aimster 11 decision provides a more palatable
approach than Sony by looking at the probability of noninfringing use,268 this
standard simply remains too speculative. Looking at actual infringing use of
the product is a more practical and effective approach. Regardless of what a
software distributor or technology intended to do or is likely to do, the new
standard proposed in this Note looks to what is actually happening.26  The
product is analyzed from the viewpoint of actual use, rather than probable or
capable use. This approach leads to a more concrete application of secondary
liability.
The second element, the willful blind eye, is important because it captures
infringers who purposefully look the other way in order to avoid liability.20 If
Grokster executives, or judges in the Ninth Circuit actually used Grokster's
software, both would have realized the rampant infringement activities occur-
ring because of the software. 7 ' However, the lesson learned by companies like
Grokster was not that they should not be aiding and abetting copyright in-
fringement, but that they should configure their system in a way that gives
them the appearance of not having control of the infringement activities of its
users. 7 2 As illustrated by Aimster 11, just as a drug dealer who pretends to be
working under the hood of his car during a drug deal he orchestrated cannot
escape liability, the same goes for P2P software distributors who affirmatively
take steps to avoid liability.2 3 It is also probably not by accident that Grokster
Ltd. is incorporated off-shore; perhaps another indication of its efforts to evade
liability.274
The willful blind eye element must be codified. Although it was a vital de-
ciding factor in Aimster 11,275 the Grokster 11 court said that it was inapplicable
in the secondary liability theory of copyright infringement. 76 Codification of
this element will first lead to a clarification of the circuit and intra-circuit splits
267 Sony Corp. ofAm., 464 U.S. at 491-2.
268 Aimster 11, 334 F.3d at 653.
269 Feder, supra note 21, at 910.
270 Aimster 1I, 334 F.3d at 650.
271 Hearings, supra note 8 (referring to discussion about the widespread infringement).
272 Sony Revisited, supra note 67 at 19.
273 Aimster 1I, 334 F.3d at 650 ("[B]y using encryption software to prevent himself from
learning what surely he strongly suspects to be the case: that the users of his service -
maybe all the users of his service - are copyright infringers.").
274 See Grokster's website, at http://www.grokster.com/aboutus.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2005) ("Grokster, LTD. is an international software company... [that] is privately held
and headquartered in Nevis, West Indies.").
275 See id ("Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law where indeed it may be
enough that the defendant should have known of the direct infringement, as it is in the law
generally.") (internal citations omitted).
276 Grokster I1, 380 F.3d at 1162.
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as to whether the willful blind eye theory applies in secondary liability. It also
will successfully capture infringers who have a "guilty state of mind." '277
With regard to the third element, the effect on the market," 8 this is again a
very present-minded focus. The question is whether the infringing activity of
this product has a demonstrable and significant deteriorating effect on the mar-
ket in which it seeks to exploit. 79 If it is a matter of an individual, copying one
song for their private use on one occasion, though still illegal, the violation will
probably not be sufficient to hold the software distributor liable. However, if it
is shown that the infringement is so widespread that it has a deteriorating effect
on copyrighted work's market, the product should be pulled from distribu-
tion."'
2. Recommendation #2: The Implementation of an Advisory Board
Whether the standard suggested in this Note, the Induce Act, or another
mode of combating copyright infringement is enacted, one way to address un-
certainty in this new era of technology and the law would be to ask a neutral,
non-binding advisory board.2"' Perhaps as part of the Copyright Office or the
Department of Commerce, an advisory board could be created to offer opin-
ions as to the legitimacy of a product.282 This is similar to what currently takes
place in tax law: "[I]f it is not clear what the tax treatment for a particular
transaction is, a taxpayer can get a private ruling from the IRS [(Internal Reve-
nue Service)] indicating how the IRS will treat the activity based on the facts
provided by the taxpayer." '283 A similar advisory board in the copyright context
would allow a distributor or creator of software to submit its business model to
an advisory board to seek non-binding approval.2"4 Should the product be
277 Id.
278 Francavillo, supra note 3, at 885 (referring to comment about commercial exploita-
tion of the product).
279 Id. at 880-85.
280 Hearings, supra note 8, (statement of Marybeth Peters). Had Sony's VTR technol-
ogy had the multiplier effect that P2P software was, it is probable that the decision would
have been held differently. Mary Beth Peters argues that if the VCR had been designed in
such a way that when a consumer merely turned it on, copies of all of the programs he re-
corded with it were immediately made available to every other VCR in the world, there is
no doubt the Sony decision would have gone the opposite way. Id; see also Aimster II, 334
F.3d at 646 (discussing the possibility that "the purchase of a single CD could be levered
into the distribution within days or even hours of millions of identical, near-perfect . . cop-
ies of the music recorded on the CD - hence the recording industry's anxiety about file-
sharing services oriented toward consumers of popular music").






deemed potentially liable under any standard, it would allow distributors to
make the proper necessary adjustments to comply with the law itself and its
spirit. 85 This good-faith effort would be evidence of the distributor's good
intentions to not promote copyright infringement with its product.286
3. Testing the New Standard
The new legislative standard should first be tested before it is applied in ac-
tual cases so as to provide consistency in the law, and second, to ensure that
legitimate products and services are not pulled from the market. Printing com-
panies, photocopiers, TiVos and others are examples of what should be pro-
tected in any test.
i. Applying the New Standard to Sony
In first applying the new standard to the facts of Sony, the initial element is
whether actual noninfringement use significantly outweighs infringement.287
Assuming for arguments' sake that time-shifting is a fair use,288 studies per-
formed by both parties showed that the VTR's primary use was time shifting.288
Although the Court clearly did not have the new standard to apply, the Sony
plaintiffs' survey stated that "75.4% of VTR owners use their machines to re-
cord for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time . . .[and the] Defen-
dant's survey showed that 96% .. .used the machines to ...[time-shift]. 90
Regardless of whether a fact-finder would choose the plaintiff's or defendant's
survey, these percentages are high enough to show that the VTR's actual non-
infringing time-shifting use significantly outweighs that of its infringing uses.
Thus, Sony would "pass" the first element.
285 See Grokster I, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1046. The Grokster court was concerned that soft-
ware companies will exploit the loophole in the law and dodge accountability:
The Court is not blind to the possibility that Defendants may have intentionally struc-
tured their businesses to avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while
benefiting financially from the illicit draw of their wares. While the Court need not de-
cide whether steps could be taken to reduce the susceptibility of such software to
unlawful use, assuming such steps could be taken, additional legislative guidance may
be well-counseled.
Id.
286 Sony Revisited, supra note 67 at 20.
287 See discussion infra Part V.E.i.
288 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 443-56, 458-86
(1984). The majority and dissenting opinions in Sony go into great detail as to whether
time-shifting is fair use, i.e. a noninfringing activity. Id.
289 Id. at 423.
290 Id. at 424 n.4. For purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that time-shifting is still
the predominate use of VTRs, or its modern-day version, the VCR.
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The second element asks whether the defendants turn a willful blind eye to
infringement.2 ' Here, Sony did not affirmatively take actions to avoid knowl-
edge.292 Rather, the business model of the VTR technology was not to violate
the spirit of the Copyright Act.293 Its sole purpose was not to provide for the
copyright infringement of its users, rather it was created for a number of nonin-
fringing uses, including watching home videos, video rentals, and time-
shifting. 4 In other words, its business model was not created to avoid liabil-
ity. 95 Thus, Sony's VTR does not violate the willful blind eye element.
Finally, the third element asks whether there has been a deteriorating detri-
mental effect on the industry in which the copyrighted work seeks to exploit.296
Sony did not include facts to illustrate this element. However, it can be sur-
mised that the entertainment industry has remained unharmed by the selling of
VTRs. They were created prior to 1984, and the entertainment industry ap-
pears to have survived the VTR's imposition in the market. In addition, the
Nielsen Ratings system, which helps determine the advertising costs associated
with programming, developed a way to include VTR time-shifting as part of
the live audience.297 Thus, broadcasters ratings were not diminished because of
consumers time-shifting with their VTRs.
Thus, a technology such as the VTR (or VCR and DVD in more contempo-
rary times), whose actual noninfringing uses significantly outweigh its infring-
ing use, would "pass" the new standard since it does not turn a blind eye to
infringement and has not had a significant deteriorating effect on the market.
Secondary liability would not be found on behalf of these products' distribu-
tors.
ii. Applying the New Standard to Grokster
In applying the new standard to the facts of the Ninth's Circuit's Grokster -
the first element is met based on the credible allegations that Grokster soft-
ware's actual infringing use significantly outweighs its noninfringing use,
where ninety percent of the material shared was copyrighted.298 The second
element is met because the defendants had knowledge (actual and construc-
291 See discussion infra Part V.E.i.
292 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
293 See id. at 421-25 (discussing time-shifting and other uses of the VTR).
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 See discussion infra Part V.E.i.
297 Sony Corp. of Am. 464 US. at 452 n. 36. Only twenty-five percent of VTR owners
would fast-forward through commercials, and so advertisers were in no different a position
than they were with live TV, as to whether individuals would watch advertisements during
broadcasts. Id.
298 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158.
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tive), but turned a blind eye to it when Grokster first received actual notice
from the plaintiffs of the copyrighted works being shared.299 Second, Grokster
executives searched and found copyrighted material when using their prod-
uct.3"' Third, internal documents showed defendants were aware of their users'
infringement activities.30 ' In the alternative, defendants had constructive
knowledge when they should have known about the infringement activities that
were taking place via their software.3 2 Defendants could have experimented
with their product and discovered the significant amount of copyrighted works
being swapped, and defendants allegedly "made changes to their services so
that they could claim ignorance.""3 3
Finally, the last element as to whether there is a demonstrable deteriorating
effect on the content owners' market,3" the facts have clearly shown how P2P
software, including Grokster's, has brought significant harm to the industry. 5
The RIAA has been, "fighting to recover from a three-year, 18% drop in CD
sales . . . [and] [t]he association says $4.2 billion is lost each year from file
swapping."3 6 In addition:
In 2000, the top ten hits sold 60 million units in the U.S .... in 2003, the top ten hits were
cut almost in half, to 33 million units ... This slide has been caused predominantly by il-
licit P2P ... services, where these top ten hits and other valuable content are offered to us-
ers - unauthorized and for free.
30 7
Thus, Grokster's demonstrable deteriorating effect on the content owners'
market would make the company's software fail on the third element.
In sum, the Grokster service would not pass under the new standard. Its ac-
tual infringing use so heavily outweights its actual non-infringing use; the
company has repeatedly turned a blind eye to infringement; and the company's
effects on copyright owners' market has clearly been devastating from its in-
fringing activities. Grokster would be deemed secondary liable and the prod-
uct would be properly removed from the marketplace.
As demonstrated by its application to the Sony and Grokster decisions, the
new standard will prove effective in combating rampant copyright infringe-
ment through P2P software.3 0 The three elements are a practical, technology-
neutral, approach which would provide the courts with a better test to apply
299 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
300 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
301 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
302 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1154 (citing Plaintiffs brief, providing discussion about
Grokster's efforts to avoid knowledge).
303 Id.
304 See discussion infra Part V.E.i.
305 Hearings, supra note 8; see also Graham supra note 8.
306 Graham, supra note 8.
307 Hearings, supra note 8.
308 Hearings, supra note 8 (referring to widespread infringement).
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and would foster creativity without harming public access to that creativity.
VII. CONCLUSION
The courts have been inconsistent and contradictory in applying secondary
copyright infringement liability to P2P technologies, leading to circuit and in-
tra-circuit splits. These inconsistent and contradictory analyses of the courts
are partially due to the confusion in Sony. The Sony Court did not properly lay
the foundation for either contributory infringement or vicarious liability. Had
it done so, it would have allowed a better application of the law in subsequent
decisions. Sony also failed to clearly define the defense it created for contribu-
tory infringement and it failed to demonstrate how the defense should be
weighed and applied.
Regardless of Sony's inability to properly lay out the theories of secondary
liability and to provide a well-proposed defense, the P2P courts have struggled
to apply the Gershwin elements. Although the courts in Napster, Aimster, and
Grokster, had strikingly similar fact patterns before them, the courts applied
the law differently in each. The varying decisions resulted in a business model
such as Grokster's to be found not liable for secondary copyright infringement
liability, regardless of the rampant infringement occurring through its software.
Because of the courts' inability to adequately and consistently apply the law,
Congress, not the courts, should step in to remedy the flaws of secondary li-
ability in copyright infringement. 309 Sony demonstrated that Congress is the
appropriate vehicle to modernize copyright law, and the two Grokster courts
have virtually begged for Congressional intervention because they are ill-
prepared to monitor fast-paced technological advances.
Congress must enact a new standard because P2P technologies will continue
to have disastrous effects on the entertainment industry."' The copyright in-
fringement occurring because of the software is rampant and as a result, harms
the financial health of the music and motion picture industries."' While the
Induce Act is one standard that Congress can enact, it is likely that software
creators will once again find ways to avoid liability by making slight adjust-
ments to their business models. Therefore, Congress should enact the standard
proposed in this Note, which would require courts to look at (1) whether actual
infringing use significantly outweighs noninfringing use," 2 (2) whether the
309 Grokster plaintiffs have filed writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which has
been granted. This Note does not ignore the challenges that secondary liability challenges
will face in Congress. The technology lobby is strong, and has thus far been effective in
preventing passage of the Induce Act in the Senate.
310 See Hearings, supra note 8 (statement of Mitch Bainwol).
311 Id.
312 See discussion infra Part V.E.i.
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product or service violates the spirit of the Copyright Act by turning a blind
eye to infringement, 313 and (3) whether there is a demonstrable, significant, and
deteriorating effect of the copyrighted material's value in the market it seeks to
exploit."4 This standard is behavior-driven, technology-neutral, concise, and
effective in holding companies such as Grokster liable for secondary copyright
infringement. In turn, the widespread copyright infringement of P2P tech-
nologies would finally be stemmed.
Once this appropriate standard is in place, P2P technologies and copyright
authors can have a mutually beneficial relationship as Napster has proven since
the Ninth Circuit's correct decisions." 5 The once deemed "intemet music out-
law, 31 6 Napster has become a commendable example of how the music and
film industries and P2P can have a symbiotic relationship. 7 In order for this
type of relationship to become more commonplace, Congress needs to enact
effective language to deter piracy. More importantly, the public at large needs
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 See Teri Robinson, Napster Files for Bankruptcy, TECHNEWS WORLD, at
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/18048.html, (June 3, 2002); Matt Gouras, Regents
Not Interested in Buying Napster Systemwide, USA TODAY, at
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2004-04-30-tenn-notonapster x.htm?POE=-
TECISVA (Apr. 30, 2004). The Ninth Circuit decision in Napster required the company to
screen out copyrighted works from its network; upon meeting that goal, the company was
incapable of continuing in its current form and closed its doors in 2002. Id. Napster filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy and was subsequently purchased by another company, Roxio Inc.,
which embarked on a new pay-for-music website in 2003. Id; see also Napster's website, at
http://www.napster.com/why napster.html ("[Napster is] back with the answer for both the
music industry and music fans: safe, legal and reliable access to hundreds of thousands of
songs. Tens of thousands of artists now offer their music on Napster with new artists and
music added every day."); Graham, supra note 8; David McGuire, Colleges Rally Against
Music Piracy, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, at http://www.washington-post.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A28879-2004Aug24.html (Aug. 24, 2004) Napster is currently working with
universities, which often have high infringement activity, across the country to combat in-
fringement by providing legal, cheap, and easy music downloading options. Id. For exam-
ple, students at Penn State University and Cornell University have access to Napster's ser-
vices for less than Napster's normal subscription rate. Id. Penn State President Graham
Spanier has stated that the service, which is part of the student's university technology fee,
has been a great success, where students have downloaded as many as 100,000 songs a day,
and illegal file-sharing activities decreased during that same time period. Id; see also Benny
Evangelista, Cards for Paying Napster/New File Sharer Takes Page from Phone Compa-
nies, SF GATECOM, at http://www.sfgate.com/cqi-bin/article.cgifi-
le=/c/a/2003/10/27/BUG6E2J4AJ24.DTL, (Oct. 27, 2003). Napster is mimicking efforts by
the telephone industry, by providing prepaid cards that would allow cardholders to buy up to
fifteen songs from Napster's site, a sort of gift card. Id. Sold at various retail locations, it is
another commendable effort on behalf of Napster and the recording industry to first, reverse
the piracy fad that Napster created, and secondly, to create a mutually-beneficial relation-
ship. Id.
316 Graham, supra note 8.
317 See id.
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to value the creative arts and not feel that just because they can steal, they
should steal:
Without a song there would be no music; without music there would be neither sound re-
cording companies nor Napster[, Grokster, or Aimster]; without book there would be no
learning; without content, the Internet would be a lonely place; and without copyright,
there would be less prosperity and less joy in the world.318
If Congress does not act appropriately and swiftly, P2P technologies and the
entertainment industries will share the same fate as Romeo and Juliet: "For
never was a story of more woe Than this of Juliet and her Romeo." 3 9
318 MICHAEL REMINGTON, NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, NAPSTER
AND THE DIGITAL AGE: THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT LAw 53 (2001).
319 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 5, sc. 3.
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